Since the introduction of Deng Xiaoping's Open Door policy in 1979, the value and complexity of Sino-Japanese economic ties have grown exponentially. However, even as economic ties have developed, security relations have deteriorated as perceptions of a 'China threat' and a 're-militarised Japan' have emerged in Tokyo and Beijing.
Interdependence and Neorealism
e competing theories of liberal-interdependence and neorealism conceive of the conditions under which states interact di erently. Neorealists state that interaction is a product of the anarchical (i.e., the absence of a sovereign power) system of states. 1 ey emphasise that, in such a system, states must give their overwhelming priority to achieving security by maintaining a balance of military-strategic power with rival states. 2 For neorealists, anarchy also works to constrain state cooperation, as the competitive nature of the international system means that states are most concerned about preventing the relative gains of rivals. 3 ere are two broad schools of neorealism. e split lies in how these schools understand the way states attempt to achieve security. 4 O ensive realists posit that, to achieve security, states seek to maximise their share of world power, with the ultimate goal of regional hegemony.
5
In contrast, defensive realists 6 contend that states do the minimum necessary to counter perceived threats and maintain a balance of power.
7
For defensive realists, threats from other states are assessed according to that state's 'geographic proximity, o ensive capability and perceived intentions. ' 8 Complex interdependence theorists do not entirely reject realist principles regarding the importance of the balance of power or state security. 9 However, they contend that the international states system has evolved into a 'world of complex interdependence, ' 10 or 'trading states. '
11
Interdependence theorists Keohane and Nye posit a system of states where states do not exercise force in their region; there are multiple channels of transgovernmental and/or trans-national contact; and there is no clear hierarchy of issues amongst states, because military security is no longer their dominant consideration. 12 Interdependence theorists contend that states are increasingly focused on economic growth and social welfare, which is best obtained through international economic cooperation, and these forces drive states into relationships of mutual dependence. 13 Interdependence theories generally contend that con ict is reduced between states engaged in interdependent economic relations.
14 One argument contends that as the value of the social welfare bene ts gained from state cooperation increases, so too do the costs of con ict (i.e., the loss of those bene ts), and consequently this reduces the incidence of con ict. 15 is interdependence further reduces con ict by creating a positive feedback loop whereby cooperation encourages further cooperation, resulting in a 'functional web of interdependence ' . 16 A second approach contends that economic interdependence creates domestic-level interest groups such as consumers and producers, who bene t from peaceful relations and apply domestic pressure on national governments to prevent the outbreak of con icts. 17 Neorealists critique interdependence in a number of ways. First, neorealists contend that survival is the pre-eminent value of states. 18 erefore, when facing a threat, states must prioritise the security imperative and balance militarily against an identi ed threat, regardless of the costs and foregone bene ts. Neorealists describe a 'security dilemma' , where self-help e orts by one state to increase its own security, either through building alliances or increasing military strength, create a corresponding reduction in the feeling of security felt by other states. Other states will then respond to their feelings of reduced security by taking similar self-help measures to increase their own security. 19 For neorealists, in a system characterised by self-help and anarchy, economic interdependence can only be a weak in uence.
Second, neorealists tend to dismiss interdependence, arguing that the ability to adjust policy in response to external events indicates a lack of su cient vulnerability to create dependency. 20 Waltz argues that economic vulnerability is a rare circumstance that occurs where a state is quantitatively dependent on high percentages of trade and investment or qualitatively dependent on a scarce product or service. 21 Neorealists further argue that under anarchy, states seek only relative gains, 22 and that interdependence is in fact a cloaked form of dependency where stronger states manipulate their rivals' vulnerabilities into arrangements that allow them to reap unequal bene ts. 23 According to this perspective, interdependence actually heightens the risk of con ict because the exploitation of vulnerabilities o en leads to con ict. e US oil embargo against Japan in 1941 has been cited as a classic example.
A third neorealist critique contends that closer contact through economic interdependence increases the points of potential competitive tension between states, thereby amplifying the potential for con ict. 25 Neorealists contend that intense competition results in rises and falls in the relative power of states and is therefore a common precursor to war.
26
For example, in her study of trade relations, Barbieri found that extensive economic interdependence increased the likelihood that states would engage in con ict.
27
For neorealists, increased economic interdependence means increased economic competition, and therefore, an increased chance of con ict.
Sino-Japanese Relations is paper contends that Sino-Japanese relations can only be fully understood by applying both economic interdependence and neorealist theoretical perspectives. Defensive realism accurately describes the way Tokyo and Beijing seek to militarily balance against threats, while economic interdependence theories illuminate the signi cant costs that economic cooperation can create and its real e ects on economic policy choice. However, neorealism fails to appreciate the complexity of Sino-Japanese economic relations, and in particular, that such bonds are not easily broken. Conversely, economic interdependence theories overestimate the ability of economic cooperation to translate into the military-strategic policy choices of Tokyo and Beijing.
Sino-Japanese Economic Interdependence
Sino-Japanese economic interdependence is characterised by lucrative bilateral trade and investment, with Japan and China obtaining large welfare bene ts from their economic relations.
28
In addition, signi cant integrated production operations are present. Simply understood, foreign trade confers bene ts on national economies by giving consumers access to better and cheaper goods and increasing the size of markets for producers. 29 e economies of both Japan and China are integrated into the world economy. In 2005, Japan's trade in goods equalled 20% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while for China it was 64% of GDP.
30
is suggests that Japan and China rely heavily on international trade and the bene ts that accrue for their national economies. Value One way to demonstrate economic interdependence is to examine the value and growth of bilateral trade. Unless otherwise indicated, the gures and charts in this section have been calculated using International Monetary Fund (IMF) Annual Trade Yearbooks. However, an important statistical limitation of IMF gures should be noted: there is a major di erence between the export and import gures reported by Japan and China.
is is primarily a result of incorrect identi cation of imports and exports moving through Hong Kong without paying duties (i.e., entrepôt trade).
31
Chart 1 shows that since the implementation of China's Open Door policy in 1979, 32 the total value of annual Sino-Japanese trade has grown exponentially, from US$6.9 billion to US$302.7 billion in 2010. Sino-Japanese trade has grown at a compound average rate of 15% since 1979, and has proven consistent over both the Japanese and Chinese export and import sectors. e annual value of Japanese exports to China has grown from US$3.94 billion in 1979 to US$133.9 billion in 2007, while Chinese exports to Japan have risen from US$2.93 billion to US$127.6 billion. ese gures demonstrate the impressive value and consistency of trade interdependence between Japan and China. 
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Relative Importance
A second demonstration of Sino-Japanese economic interdependence is the relative importance of Japan and China to each other's external trade. From the Japanese perspective:
1. China is Japan's most important partner, with two-way trade comprising 19% of Japanese imports and exports; 2. China is Japan's second-most important export market at 17%; and 3. China is Japan's most important single-country source of imports at 21%.
From the Chinese perspective:
1. Japan is one of China's three most important trading partners at 15%; 2. Japan is China's third-most important export market (excluding Hong Kong) at 14%; and 3. Japan is China's most important single-country import source at 15.2%.
Trends
Trade gures may also be used to identify trends in Sino-Japanese bilateral trade. Charts 2, 3 and 4 show that China has become increasingly signi cant for Japan as an export market, import source and trading partner.
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Second, Charts 5, 6 and 7 show that from a high starting point, the relative importance of Japan for China is declining in all these areas.
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Trade Intensity
A further measure, trade intensity indices, demonstrates the level of trade bias. Using the method adopted by Hilpert with updated IMF gures, 35 this measure assesses the preference of the Chinese and Japanese economies for trade with each other within the context of their respective shares of world trade. An unbiased trading relationship is equivalent to 1. Sino-Japanese relations exhibit signi cant trade intensity, with a signi cant bias on both sides. Table 1 shows trade intensity for Japanese exports. In 2005, Japan exported on average 2.6 times more to China than to the rest of the world. Similarly, Table 2 shows that in 2005, China exported 2.8 times more to Japan than to the rest of the world. 
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In 2006, Japanese rms invested US$9.9 billion in China, which accounted for 5.1% of total Chinese FDI in ows, although this is well down from the relative highs of 16.1% and 14.4% of 1985 and 1990. 44 In 2006, Japanese FDI was China's sixth largest source, 
Japanese-led Asian Production Networks
In addition to the welfare bene ts outlined above, Japanese FDI made as part of Japanese-led APNs generates further economic interdependence. Japanese multinational rms have long conceptualised the Asian region as a 'technologically strati ed economy' and sought to create Japanese-led APNs using a division of labour that would e ciently exploit the factor advantage of each country. A ' ying geese' model 48 was envisaged, with Japan playing the lead role by providing high-technology, high-value input in research and development, design and precision manufacturing. e newly-industrialised economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan would provide high-to-medium-technology input, with Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia and ailand responsible for medium-to-low-technology input.
49
Since Hatch and Yamamura wrote their seminal study of Japanese-led APNs, the ying geese model has changed in certain respects. Notably, China has increasingly displaced other economies at the bottom of the chain because of its lower cost-base and openness to FDI.
50
Japanese FDI in Context
China's Open Door economic reforms have focused on encouraging Chinese Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs) to engage in export production activities which are dependent on advanced foreign technology and industrial organization.
51
Chinese policy-makers encourage this arrangement to generate economic activity and create low-skill employment. Additionally, there is an expectation of technology transfer.
52
However, one result of China's reform pattern is an increasing dependence on foreign investment. FIEs dominate the trade sector, accounting for 58% of exports in 2003.
53
As a result, the expansion of the export sector and the ow-on bene ts such as employment are dependent on increased FDI from Japan (and other industrialised economies). Chinese economic dependency on FIEs, and increasingly, Wholly Owned Foreign Enterprises (WOFEs), is especially pronounced in the industrial and high-technology sectors where these rms account for 88% of exports.
54
For example, Charts 11 and 12 show that, as Chinese exports in industrial machinery grew, FIEs also increased their share of production. Similar trends were also experienced in the telecommunication and computer industries. Japanese FDI in China is generally part of Japanese-led APNs. 56 In general, Japanese rms investing in China focus on export-oriented production and channel investment into either labour-intensive assembly operations, or small to medium-sized rms that produce low-to-medium-technology intermediate goods. 57 is creates interdependence because Chinese economic activity and employment are dependent on Japanese rms, as the Chinese links in the network cannot operate independently. Japanese rms become dependent, too, as they rely on China's lower cost-base to maintain international competitiveness. ere is also an important geographical dimension. Japanese FDI in China tends to cluster in the Bohai Sea Rim (food and apparel), the Yangtze River Delta (machine tools and electronics), Pearl River/Zhujiang (precision producers and electronics) and the Central West economic zones (still emerging), making these areas especially sensitive to the gains owing from Japanese FDI. 58 In addition to the level of Chinese economic development noted above, Japanese manufacturers' investment in China also re ects the apprehensions of Japanese policy makers, who fear Japanese industry being 'hollow[ed] out' by China's rise. 59 Japanese rms are encouraged to protect their competitive advantages by maintaining precision and high-technology production operations in Japan. 60 For example, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) encouraged NEC to sell its plasma display business to Japanese-owned Pioneer rather than to a foreign rm.
61
Similarly, Canon chose to base its optical sensor factory in Japan.
62
As a result, FDI into China has concentrated on nal assembly operations and this creates dependency on Japanesedesigned production equipment and standards. 63 A further bene t for China of Japanese FDI is the technological and industrial development it facilitates. 64 However, this has also been a source of tension as Chinese rms and o cials tend to criticize Japanese rms for restricting transfers to low-level technology due to a fear of the 'boomerang e ect' . 65 Nakagane disputes this claim, arguing that technology transfer occurs in response to economic advantage, and so further Chinese development will attract higher technology investment. 66 However, Hatch and Yamamura have persuasively shown that Japanese rms try to use production networks to maintain control over technology, 67 and the concentration of Japanese FDI in labour-intensive and low-technology production supports this conclusion. 68 at said, although Japanese rms seek to control the speed of technology transfer, bene ts do continue to accrue in the Chinese economy, and FDI remains the predominant source of technology transfer.
69
For example, NEC and Hitachi have both established advanced production operations in China. 70 e empirical evidence shows that signi cant Sino-Japanese economic cooperation is occurring, as both Japan and China accrue large welfare bene ts from the size of their trade relations. Additionally, the integration of Chinese manufacturing into Japaneseled APNs creates further interdependence as Chinese rms lack the technology and productivity to operate independently, and Japanese rms rely on Chinese rms in their wider supply chains.
71
Sino-Japanese Economic Competition
It has been shown that Sino-Japanese economic relations are lucrative and provide mutual bene ts. However, there are also potential dangers in a relationship of interdependence. Interdependence heightens the frequency and intensity of contact between states, and interdependence theorists warn that friction may emerge from competition over the division of economic bene ts.
72
For neorealists, increased competition is particularly important as they consider state competition a common precursor to con ict.
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Given this, it is necessary to explore the dimension of competition to fully characterise the nature of Sino-Japanese economic interdependence.
In general, there is little evidence of Sino-Japanese trade friction severe enough to cause political spillover e ects and create bilateral con ict. is does not exclude the existence of strong Sino-Japanese competition or discriminatory trade barriers. Rather, there do not appear to be examples of friction comparable with the US-Japan 'trade wars' , and the EU/US-China textile disputes. 74 is is in contrast with the intrusion of Sino-Japanese political disputes into the economic realm; for example, the Chinese suspensions of rare earth exports, and the joint exploration of East China Sea gas elds in response to Japan's detention of the captain and crew of a Chinese shing boat that rammed a Japanese coast guard vessel in September 2010 near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. is section will examine three factors that have led to the absence of signi cant SinoJapanese economic friction.
e E ect of Japanese-led APNs
As described above, Japanese FDI in China is concentrated in manufacturing, as part of Japan's integrated APNs. 76 is o -shoring of Japanese manufacturing and the creation of a liates in China assists in facilitating the Sino-Japanese intermediate goods trade. Japanese a liates in China drive procurement of Japanese-sourced parts and equipment, either via pressure from the Japanese-based 'mother company ' , 77 or by the in-built dependency of the a liate on high-value Japanese-based equipment and intermediate products. 78 e result is managed trade that creates mutual economic bene ts. Japanese rms hold their place at the technological edge and drive productivity, while for China, labour-intensive assembly jobs help create employment and provide technology transfer. However, some bilateral tensions have arisen, stemming from Chinese perceptions that Japanese rms are reluctant to transfer technology, 79 as well as protectionist Chinese laws aimed at forcing foreign manufacturers to shi production to China; for example, the imposition of higher duties on imported hybrid vehicles. 80 e E ect of the WTO System Arguably, the most important reason for a lack of friction is China's accession to the WTO and its subsequent general acceptance of the WTO system. ere are two key consequences for Sino-Japanese relations: rst, market access and economic liberalisation made in preparation for WTO entry and mandated in the post-accession period are opening Chinese domestic markets to Japanese competition; is includes a willingness to comply with international trade law when both formally and informally challenged.
85
Japanese rms seeking to compete in the Chinese market have bene ted from the improved market access created by the WTO reforms, but barriers and problems remain. Generally, trade friction has been managed through the WTO, and bilaterally through the Japan-China Economic Partnership Consultation (JCEPC) process. Although Japan has not initiated WTO action against China on any issue, Tokyo has been an interested third party or has participated in consultations on a number of actions where China was the respondent to claims made by other economies.
90
While the use of WTO and JCEPC mechanisms indicate that some Sino-Japanese trade friction exists, the management of issues including IP 91 and the importation of integrated circuits 92 and automobile parts 93 through these mechanisms has prevented further escalation. Consequently, the available evidence suggests that market access and competition issues have yet to generate major con ict in bilateral relations that is comparable to the bitter US-Japan trade wars. 94 at said, it is worth keeping an eye on issues such as IP protection. Japan has raised IP in a number of international fora and joined, as a third party, the US WTO case against China for its failure to adequately protect IP.
95 e E ect of the Nature of Chinese FDI Finally, it is worth noting that the lack of bilateral economic friction may also be partly explained by the absence of Chinese rms attempting visible takeovers of Japanese rms or aggressively competing in the Japanese market. FDI stock at US$95.8 billion.
97
Chinese FDI is also generally concentrated in assembly and natural resources projects, making Japan a relatively unattractive destination. 98 Furthermore, in relation to takeovers, anecdotal evidence suggests (the Japanese government keeps no o cial gures) that Chinese FDI takes a so approach by avoiding takeovers. For example, China's Haier and Guangdong Galanz Enterprise have both entered into the Japanese market using joint ventures with Japanese rms.
99
Haier partnered with Japan's Sanyo, allowing it to utilize Sanyo's distribution network to sell Haier-branded products in Japan, in return for providing Sanyo with access to its Chinese distribution network.
100
Consequently, there have so far been no takeover controversies comparable with Chinese CNOOC's withdrawn bid for US company Unocal.
101
Additionally, where Chinese rms have entered the Japanese market, they have also aimed at the less sophisticated and less lucrative ends of the market.
102
For example, Haier targeted the budget end of the Japanese whitegoods market.
Finally, it should be noted that while Chinese-branded goods may pose a threat to some Japanese manufacturers of nal consumer goods, other Japanese rms may in fact bene t. In particular, Japanese rms that produce sophisticated components may bene t from increased demand from Chinese manufacturers for their components.
103
For example, Nidec, which has a market share of approximately 70% in hard-disk drive spindle motors, has bene ted from rising Chinese demand.
104
Sino-Japanese Economic Competition Case Studies
e following case studies of Sino-Japanese economic competition illustrate how SinoJapanese trade friction is managed.
Case Study 1: Electrical Machinery
e electrical machinery industry has been a long-standing strength of Japanese manufacturers. Given that electrical machinery accounts for 20% of the value of Chinese exports to Japan, there appears to be, prima facie, a challenge to Japanese manufacturers in their home market. exports and Japanese FDI activities reveal that rising electrical machinery imports do not evidence rising Chinese competition, but rather, the success of Japanese rms in restructuring their manufacturing operations and shi ing labour-intensive operations o shore to China.
When examining the structure of Chinese exports, it is important to recall that FIEs are responsible for 88% of Chinese high-technology exports, and Chinese production is overwhelmingly concentrated in labour-intensive and medium-skilled activities, such as assembly. is means that Chinese exports of complex manufactures like electrical machinery have generally only been assembled in China and are generally produced as part of foreign-controlled production networks.
106
In the late 1990s, Japanese rms in the electrical machinery sector, motivated by the need to lower costs in their labour-intensive operations, began concentrating FDI in China to establish low-cost manufacturing and assembly operations. 107 e rise in Chinese electrical machinery imports is the result of this process. e Japanese Ministry of Finance has recognised this, noting that 'highly sophisticated parts and materials are mostly imported from Japan, ' and that 'China is the sole location for assembly. ' 108 Japanese rms assemble their electrical machinery products in China to lower costs, and then reimport the nished products back into Japan or export them from China to other world markets.
109
Consequently, the apparent absence of Japanese rms seeking protection from Chinese-import competition can be explained by an industry understanding that these imports largely stem from their own production operations, not competition from Chinese rms. In fact, Japanese rms engaged in o -shoring manufacturing operations in China have an incentive to ensure a liberal trade regime, as they are dependent upon low-cost Chinese operations for their own productivity.
Case Study 2: Textiles
Clothing and textile imports have been an especially fractious issue in EU-China trade relations. As part of the terms of its 2001 WTO accession, China accepted the MultiFibre Arrangement (MFA), which restricted textile exports from developing countries to developed countries. e MFA governed the world trade in textiles and garments from 1974 through 2004, imposing quotas on the amount developing countries could export to developed countries. e MFA expired on 1 January 2005 with the transition to WTO arrangements. However, following its expiration, Chinese exports ooded into the EU (and the US). is created a trade dispute, as 75 million Chinese garments were held in European ports and the matter was settled only a er high-level negotiations. 110 Yet, in contrast, Sino-Japanese trade friction over textiles has not emerged to any comparable degree.
111
is is despite rising import penetration of the Japanese textile market from below 20% in 1980 to 40% in 1990 and 85% in 2005, the vast majority sourced from China. 112 e absence of Sino-Japanese friction supports the nding in the rst case study above: that the complementary nature of Sino-Japanese economic strengths and integration of Chinese rms into Japanese-led APNs has tended to mitigate tensions. Since the 1960s, the Japanese textile industry has been in decline and has experienced continual restructuring, with Japanese rms shi ing labour-intensive operations to South-East Asia, and from the 1980s, to China. Additionally, while the volume of Chinese textile exports to Japan continues to rise, they represent only 60% of the value-add. 113 is suggests that Japanese rms have retained a position in the capital-and technologyintensive stages of production.
114
Furthermore, as with electrical machinery, the recent surge in Chinese textile imports was preceded by signi cant Japanese FDI in the Chinese textile industry, indicating that Japanese rms are promoting and controlling signi cant parts of the Chinese export sector. 115 e integration of Sino-Japanese textile production has proved critical in mitigating potential friction. Yoshimatsu examined the failed attempt by some Japanese textile manufacturers to obtain WTO safeguard measures against Chinese imports.
116
He found that Japanese rms that have integrated o shore production from China into their operations are dependent upon importing nished products into Japan. In Japan, industrial associations play an integral role in coordinating industry matters, such as protection, with the government.
117
Although members of the textile industry body began to lobby for protection, METI resisted industry pressure to restrict imports, determining that the industry body was actually divided on the merits of protection. In particular, a number of powerful Japanese trading companies with established Chinese operations did not support the industry body's e orts because they were dependent upon a liberalised trading regime. group interdependence acting to reduce the potential for Sino-Japanese trade con ict by undermining potential protectionism.
119
Sino-Japanese economic relations do not exhibit con ict-creating competition. Japanese-led APNs which deeply integrate rms from both countries e ectively manage bilateral trade and help to ensure that cooperative gains are distributed in a mutually acceptable manner. APNs have also created domestic interest groups who promote the interests of liberalised trade. In addition, the WTO system has established a mutually acceptable framework for the resolution of disputes and prevented any spill-over into the political realm. Finally, Chinese rms have yet to mount visible competition in areas of Japanese economic strength.
e Sino-Japanese Balance of Power Neorealist theories predict that Japan and China's relative power will dictate their behaviour, with power de ned in military-strategic terms. 120 is paper argues that defensive realism best describes Sino-Japanese security relations, as Tokyo and Beijing seek to maximise their individual security by balancing against perceived threats.
121
In particular, economic interdependence appears absent from their security decision-making.
e Sino-Japanese balance of power is complicated by the presence of US military power. e role of the US remains indispensable to understanding the Sino-Japanese security balance. e alliance with Washington continues to underpin Tokyo's postCold War security.
122
However, the respective interests of Washington and Tokyo do not always converge, so analysts o en conceptualise North-East Asian security in terms of the Beijing-Tokyo-Washington strategic triangle.
123
While US military power acts as the ultimate guarantee of Japanese security, the alliance raises a constant dilemma for Tokyo. Japan must both hedge against the risks of US abandonment while avoiding unwanted con ict with China. con rmed Washington's commitment to security in the Asia-Paci c region and to maintaining its military presence. Crucially, the Nye Initiative foreshadowed an expanded role for Tokyo in these e orts. In its wake, Beijing began to doubt that the USJapan alliance still played its traditional role in capping Japanese military ambition. However, analysts are divided over Beijing's strategic intentions. Defensive realists like Kissinger and Brzezinski consider that Beijing may accumulate greater power in an attempt to balance against the perceived US threat, but that it will not seek to overturn the current East Asian order.
130
In particular, they believe that the bene ts reaped by China from the current regional order and the di culty in confronting the US make con ict unlikely.
131
In contrast, o ensive realists are more pessimistic. ey contend that states seek security by maximising their power, and predict a Chinese attempt to overturn the current US-led security environment and establish regional hegemony. 132 e result will be confrontation with the US (and Japan).
e growing Sino-Japanese security dilemma is evidenced by a series of developments since the 1990s that illustrate Tokyo and Beijing's perceptions of threat and their engagement in balancing behaviour. Particularly notable are: • Chinese nuclear testing and modernisation;
136
• Chinese conventional force modernisation;
137
• Japanese force modernisation and force posture changes;
138
• Japanese legislative and institutional reforms, particularly the relaxing of restrictions on the deployment of the Japanese Self-Defense Force;
139
• Japanese external balancing through a tightening of the US-Japan alliance;
140
• Japanese participation in the development of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in partnership with the US.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an in-depth analysis of all these issues. However, Japan's development of BMD provides an excellent case study for analysing the Sino-Japanese security dilemma and illustrating some important aspects of the above issues.
Ballistic Missile Defence
Japanese development of BMD impacts upon Tokyo's alliance dilemma, as the operational and technical aspects of BMD require an integrated US-Japan partnership, creating a complex web of military interdependence. e stationing of key platforms in Japan, joint US-Japan 'command and control systems' , and Japan's technological dependence on US early-warning systems all work to tie Tokyo to US policy choices.
141
is reduces the risk of US abandonment, while increasing the risk of entrapment through the 'compulsive logic of BMD technology. ' 142 For example, in the event of a Sino-US con ict, such as over Taiwan, the use by the US of BMD platforms, related facilities and sensors stationed in Japan would make it extremely di cult for Japan to stand apart from the con ict. e Nye Initiative foreshadowed greater Japanese participation in BMD. 144 However, US-Japan development of eatre Missile Defence (TMD) emerged a er the 1996 Hashimoto-Clinton Declaration, 145 as Tokyo and Washington sought to reinvigorate the alliance. 146 Tokyo's reluctance to commit to BMD earlier was based on the implications of its security dilemma with Beijing, particularly the risk of entrapment created by tightening the alliance with Washington. 147 Tokyo's decision to participate in BMD was prompted by its concerns over Chinese and North Korean missile threats. e North Korean threat is a substantial element of Japan's strategic calculus, particularly following the ring of a missile over Honshu in 1998, but is also a useful piece of domestic justi cation for BMD participation. 148 at said, it is the Chinese missile threat which is critical to Japan's long-term thinking. 149 Tokyo's pursuit of BMD was not an immediate response to China (or North Korea) possessing missile capability, as Beijing has a long-standing missile program; rather, it emerged as Tokyo began to harbour doubts about Beijing's strategic intentions. Tokyo's appreciation of a missile threat was prompted by China's 1995 nuclear testing, Beijing's opaque military modernisation program, and the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. ese incidents combined to exacerbate Tokyo's doubts about Beijing's intentions and its ability to exercise in uence over Beijing through a long-standing strategy of commercial liberalism. 150 Consequently, Japan's previous caution regarding BMD largely evaporated as it sought to balance against a China threat.
Tokyo has balanced against the missile threat posed by Beijing (and Pyongyang), both through the development of its indigenous BMD capabilities 151 and through BMD cooperation with Washington. Ultimately, Tokyo appears to have determined that the risks of entrapment in the US-alliance and a possible Sino-Japanese arms race 152 were outweighed by the need to balance against strongly-held suspicions of a Chinese missile threat. 153 is suggests that Tokyo is following the logic of defensive realism by balancing against a threat. Beijing's sensitivity to a US-Japanese BMD partnership is based upon three implications for Chinese security. First, BMD heightens Beijing's fears of a remilitarised Japan.
Second, it threatens to undermine Beijing's conventional-missile and nuclear-missile deterrence. ird, it potentially tilts the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and East China Sea against Beijing.
Remilitarised Japan e US-Japan BMD partnership increases Beijing's fears of a remilitarised Japan in two ways. First, Beijing considers BMD systems to be o ensive in nature and, second, BMD increases Beijing's doubts about the US-Japan alliance. Tokyo (and Washington) asserts that BMD is a purely defensive capability directed at denying missile strikes from perceived rogue states, particularly North Korea.
155
Since the use of BMD is contingent upon coming under missile attack, Tokyo and Washington contend it must therefore be a defensive system.
156
However, Chinese analysts consider that BMD lacks the technological sophistication needed to deny Chinese missile capabilities.
157
Beijing remains sceptical about the real targets of Japanese-US BMD 158 and conceives of BMD in di erent terms. First, Chinese analysts adopt the perspective of conventional deterrence theory; that is, that potential attackers are deterred when they believe an attack will be costly and unlikely to succeed.
159
Accordingly, BMD constitutes an o ensive capability because it shi s the balance of power against Beijing by denying, or at least reducing, the deterrence value of Chinese strategic and conventional missiles. Tokyo's increased willingness to partner with Washington militarily has also led to a growing belief in Beijing that the US-Japan alliance is being used as cover for a more assertive Japan.
162
Since Washington considers BMD a purely defensive capability, it believes partnering with Japan in BMD is a justi able component of rebalancing the USJapan alliance. However, given that Beijing considers BMD an o ensive capability, this cooperation fuels Chinese doubts that the US-Japan alliance still works to cap Japanese military ambition. 163 Beijing fears that BMD creates a combination of greater security responsibilities and o ensive capabilities that will break Tokyo's longstanding norms 155 Fukuda,  of military self-restraint. 164 Consequently, Beijing views US-Japan BMD collaboration as Washington's support for Tokyo's acquisition of o ensive military capabilities and remilitarisation. 165 
Nuclear Deterrence
Beijing remains concerned that US-Japan BMD is intended to undermine its nuclear deterrence. 166 Washington and Tokyo contend that BMD lacks the capabilities to deny the o ensive to a nuclear force the size of China's. However, both the proposed BMD interceptor speeds and the speci cations of intended target missiles correlate strongly with Beijing's strategic capabilities. 167 For Beijing, BMD potentially changes the strategic balance and alters the force level necessary to exercise minimum nuclear deterrence against the US and Japan. Beijing worries that BMD provides Tokyo with the deterrence 'spear' of US nuclear forces and the deterrence 'shield' of denial. 168 Beijing fears that the removal of its nuclear deterrence would allow Tokyo to respond less cautiously in the event of a Sino-Japanese or Sino-US clash. Although Gronlund argues that, even with a 95% e ective BMD system, the risk of a nuclear attack on a city is unacceptable, 169 Beijing is extremely sensitive to the way that BMD developments impact on strategic deterrence. Beijing's sensitivity, and belief that BMD is fundamentally o ensive, explains why it has continued to pursue conventional and nuclear missile force modernisation despite security-dilemma theory positing that a notionally defensive system such as BMD should not create an arms race. 170 
Taiwan
Beijing interprets BMD as a threat because of the potential to upset the current status quo relating to Taiwan. First, Beijing employs its strategic missiles both to discourage Taiwanese moves toward independence and to deter US intervention in the event of a Taiwan Strait con ict. 171 wide Missile Defence (NTMD) systems, which Washington and Tokyo claim are for use against North Korean threats, are equally deployable in the event of a Taiwan crisis. Beijing is sensitive to the possibility that the NTMD could be used to shield Taiwan from Chinese missiles and fears this may embolden a declaration of independence. Beijing is concerned that Tokyo, through enhanced interoperability with the US, could intervene in the event of a crisis in support of US NTMD platforms; for example, via the deployment of Japanese BMD-equipped Aegis destroyers.
173
For Beijing, these concerns are based upon two scenarios: either that Tokyo is drawn into a Sino-US con ict because of the integrated nature of BMD systems and related alliance obligations, or that intervening in a Taiwan crisis is, in fact, Tokyo's real intention. 174 e US-Japan BMD partnership has consolidated the broader US-Japan security alliance, as sought by Tokyo.
175
Tokyo has created deep bilateral military interdependence by both hosting US platforms such as the X-band radar at Shariki Air Base, and purchasing interoperable systems such as the Aegis BMD.
176
Tokyo has further cemented the US relationship through extensive BMD research and development collaboration. Notably, it has revised its legal and policy frameworks to permit BMD-related technology transfer to the US. For example, under Japan's ree Principles on Arms Control Exports, Japan is prohibited from transferring arms and arms-related technology, but it was determined that this policy would not apply to BMD.
177
However, Tokyo has also increased its risk of entrapment and reduced its freedom of strategic choice, in particular due to its ongoing dependency on US-provided early warning and other related information, for example, Japan's reliance on US X-band radar data.
178
Notwithstanding the large overall US military presence in Japan, the logic of BMD technology makes it extremely di cult for Tokyo to stay out of potential Sino-US clashes where Washington would seek to use BMD or NTMD.
Defensive realism clearly describes the military-security policy choices of Tokyo and Beijing. ere is no evidence in this case study that policy makers in either Beijing or Tokyo re ected on the consequences for economic interdependence when formulating their responses to security challenges. Beijing is conscious of its strategic weakness and is seeking to balance and deter Washington and Tokyo by modernising its strategic power, while Tokyo is uncertain about Beijing's future ambitions and has engaged in 173 Eto, 'Successful internal and external balancing behaviour. Sino-Japanese relations are characterised by a classic strategic dilemma: as both states attempt to enhance their own security, such moves provoke fears in the other and cause balancing behaviour.
Conclusion
is paper supports the neorealist contention that economic interdependence is only an intervening variable in international relations, largely because of its failure to shape states' perceptions of, and responses to, security threats. Tokyo and Beijing have consistently made policy choices designed to increase their own strategic capabilities, with little obvious regard for the potential damage this may cause to economic relations. Tokyo and Beijing appear unable to remove the mutually felt perception of threat, and are thus locked in a security dilemma. 179 It would appear that either economic interdependence theory is awed because, as neorealists contend, security always takes precedence; 180 or that Sino-Japanese interdependence is insu ciently complex to a ect calculations in other policy areas. 181 One indication that interdependence is insu ciently complex is that signi cant regional security institutions are notably lacking in East Asia. Keohane and Nye emphasise that international organisations are a critical ingredient in the formation of complex interdependence. 182 us, the absence of institutions establishing rules and norms for security relations appears to preclude genuine strategic cooperation between Beijing and Tokyo. 183 However, the Sino-Japanese security dilemma stems from inherently incompatible security interests and strategic objectives; in particular, the division over the East Asian militarystrategic balance. For while Japan supports the US intention to maintain a 'preponderance' of power, 184 China continues to push for 'multilateralism, ' meaning at the very least a signi cant diminution of US power. 185 It is questionable whether institutions could be developed to establish security cooperation when such a fundamental divide exists. 186 First, neorealist theories contend that economic interdependence is merely the product of manipulation of weaker states by more powerful rivals; 187 and second, that under conditions of anarchy, states acting under a security dilemma will not assist a rival to make relative gains. 188 e weight of strategic power favours the US-Japan alliance and, as shown in this paper, these powers jointly view China as a potential threat.
However, Tokyo (and Washington) continues to engage Beijing economically, and thereby aid its development. Two possible interpretations have been pro ered, neither of which is congruent with neorealist theory. First, as argued by Green, Tokyo has abandoned hopes of using economic interdependence to directly in uence Beijing, but is still seeking to integrate China into the international system to encourage regional stability.
189
Secondly, and conversely, Japanese prosperity appears dependent on continued Chinese economic growth. Copeland has shown that the US economy would su er negatively from a stall in the Chinese economy and Japan could be expected to experience similar problems. 190 us, it would seem that the bonds of economic interdependence are stronger than neorealists assert. e result is a paradox: SinoJapanese relations comprise a form of economic interdependence that is of insu cient strength to in uence security policy choices; however, security con icts are not serious enough to a ect economic interdependence.
191
Tokyo's and Beijing's security policies have been clearly shaped by perceptions of threat and a reference to the East Asian balance of power, not by their economic interdependence. e tensions in Sino-Japanese security relations are thus best analysed through the lens of neorealist theory. However, neorealism is unable to adequately explain the co-existence of a thriving Sino-Japanese economic relationship with a growing security dilemma. e challenge for both neorealist and interdependence theories is to adequately account for the disparity between military-strategic competition and complex economic interdependence. 187 Waltz, ' 
